ABSTRACT. Although many African countries have recently embarked on revisions of their land legislations to give recognition to customary arrangements and strengthen women's rights, few studies assess the actual or potential economic impact of such steps. We use data from Uganda to assess the impact of tenure regime, perceived transfer rights, and legal knowledge on investment, productivity, and land values. While results support strong and positive investment-impacts of tenure and transferability, knowledge of the new law's provisions adds considerably to these, pointing towards substantial potential from disseminating the law that has not yet been fully realized. (JEL Q15, K11)
I. INTRODUCTION
There are few issues on which neoclassical development economists seem to agree as readily as on the importance of secure property rights. Giving secure land rights to households is generally believed to increase land-related investment, augment land values, reduce the level and likelihood of conflict, and spur economic participation. It will also provide a basis for reallocating an important factor of production to more efficient users and, if accompanied by a low-cost and formal means of verifying land ownership status, can improve credit access. Based on this view of formalizing property rights as a key element for expanding the rule of law and reducing poverty, policymakers all over the world have spent significant resources on programs to formalize land tenure, award title to land, and establish the administrative infrastructure to maintain the records created in this process.
However, empirical evidence on the impact of traditional methods to increase land tenure security in Africa is rather mixed (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; Besley 1998) . In fact, a large number of rather ineffective interventions (Atwood 1990 ) led some to characterize efforts to increase tenure security as ''unimportant'' or even dangerous (Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994) while prompting others to warn against ''institutional midwifery'' that would combine an overly teleologic worldview with unrealistic perceptions about the ability to transfer blueprints between countries (Platteau 1996; Sjaastad and Bromley 2000) .
There is little doubt that African land tenure institutions are subject to extraordinary strains arising from a major economic transition and urbanization, demographic and ecological pressures, and recently the tragedy of HIV/AIDS (Andre and Platteau 1998; Deininger and Castagnini 2006) . Given the limited outreach of formal tenure systems in the continent (Oosterberg 2002) , the main burden continues to fall on customary institutions. Even though such institutions have often proven to be quite adaptive in the past, their ability to deal with gender and inter-ethnic conflict, and to maintain traditional structures of control in an increasingly impersonal ''modern'' environment cannot be taken for granted. In fact, some of the limitations of such systems have been reported to lead to problems related to gender discrimination (Khadiagala 2001; Tripp 2004) , wealth bias (Goetz 2002; Peters 2004) , and corruption (Fitzpatrick 2005) .
Recognition of the continued importance of the issue, together with the limited success of traditional and rather simplistic efforts to deal with land has given rise to a more nuanced approach that is aware of the multi-dimensional nature of land rights which is unlikely to be captured by a simple ''title-no title'' dichotomy. It views institutional change as a process that will proceed at different speeds in specific environments even within the same country, is based on local institutions, and considers clear rules and mechanisms for enforcement will be as important as the substantive content of rights (Deininger 2003) . One manifestation of this is that many African countries have recently revised their land legislation to help establish land tenure regimes offering greater tenure security to groups who have traditionally been left out based on arrangements that can be flexibly adapted to local conditions (Toulmin and Quan 2000) . However, while there are a number of descriptive accounts, few studies have aimed to evaluate the impact of such legal and institutional changes. Given the limited success, and sometimes even adverse impacts of land-tenure intervention in the past, such an assessment would clearly be highly desirable.
In this paper, we use the case of Uganda to explore the impact of a more complex set of institutional arrangements on economic outcomes, going beyond existing literature in two respects. First, we explicitly distinguish between different types of formal and informal rights by accounting for formal tenure regimes and perceived transferability of land. Second, we recognize that knowledge about legal arrangements is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for laws to have an impact, and introduce an objective measure of households' awareness about recently introduced legal provisions to account for this. An instrumental variable approach is used to obtain estimates of the effect of legal knowledge on land-related investments, agricultural productivity, and subjective land values that allows us to obtain an empirical measure for the impacts of these measures in different dimensions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes features of the rural economy in Uganda, highlighting the nature of the country's land tenure system and the changes in tenure security brought about by the new land law. Section 3 reviews the literature on tenure security and the economic impact of interventions aiming to enhance producers' land rights and, linking this general debate to Ugandan conditions, derives the framework for econometric estimation. Section 4 presents data used and a range of descriptive statistics. Section 5 comprises results regarding the impact of knowledge as well as other factors on land-related investments, efficiency of agricultural production, and self-assessed land sales. Section 6 draws out implications for policy and further research.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
To provide the context for our analysis, this section highlights the importance of tenure security and other ''sticks'' in the bundle of land rights for investment and poverty reduction in Uganda. It describes the historical events that have significantly reduced tenure security for a large number of occupants as well as the measures taken by the recently passed Land Act to restore such security and notes the gap between the desired institutional structure and actual levels of implementation.
The Relevance of Land-Related Investment Although Uganda is a rather small country by African standards, it is characterized by a high level of variation in population density, which ranges from 65 per km 2 in the north to 226 per km 2 in the southwest and in physio-geographic conditions, which vary between nomadic semideserts in the northeast and the high elevations of the west and southeast. Annual population growth of 3.3% in 1991-2002 considerably increased land scarcity, with an increase in average population density from 64 persons per km 2 in 1980 to 124 in 2002 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2005) . As more than 85% of the population live in rural areas and agriculture accounts for 77% of employment and 50% of total output (Belshaw, Lawrence, and Hubbard 1999) , land has enormous socio-economic significance as a key productive asset and source of livelihood. Household surveys indicate that land makes up more than 50% of the average household's asset endowment and that 74% of households use agricultural land for subsistence (Deininger and Okidi 2003) .
Elimination of implicit and explicit taxation of the agricultural sector in the early 1990s, together with comparatively high levels of economic growth created favorable conditions for agricultural productivity growth (Blake, McKay, and Morrissey 2002) . However, the extent of investment and associated diversification of the productive sector remained limited and productivity failed to increase as expected (Belshaw, Lawrence, and Hubbard 1999) . As a result, most of the increments in production achieved were achieved through expansion of cultivated area at the expense of woodlots, wetlands, and natural grazing areas (Place and Otsuka 2000; Pender 2004) that cannot be sustained in the future. There is consensus that higher levels of land-related investment will be critical to enhance agricultural productivity, allow the rural sector to realize its economic potential, and lay the foundation for more rapid and sustained poverty reduction that could narrow a growing rural-urban welfare gap (Kappel, Lay, and Steiner 2005) . However, few studies have explored the role of tenure insecurity in contributing to low levels of rural investment in Uganda and the implied scope of land policy to achieve broader goals. Before proceeding to the conceptual framework and the empirical part of the paper, we highlight that tenure insecurity is indeed widespread and that recent efforts to reduce it through legislative means have not yet been fully effective.
Uganda's Land Policy
The key elements of Uganda's land tenure system date back to colonial occupation. Under the 1900 Buganda agreement, the British awarded large tracts of ''mailo'' land and any smallholders occupying them to the Buganda king and his notables (Brett 1973) .
1 This led to considerable unrest and, in 1928, the legal recognition of residual rights of the original occupants (who had been converted into tenants by a stroke of the pen) through the ''busuulu'' (ground rent) and ''envujju'' (tribute) laws which put a limit on the rent to be paid and provided protection against eviction without compensation of investment made on the land. All land not covered under the Buganda agreement was declared Crown Land, thereby allowing the government to alienate the land (as well as its occupants) under freehold or leasehold grants. As a result of these measures, peasants on mailo or customary lands were deprived of their ownership rights. The ensuing insecurity and overlap of property rights created not only a fertile ground for conflict but also severe disincentives for land-related investment.
Nationalization of land under Idi Amin's 1975 land reform decree added to the complexity. The decree abolished freehold and mailo ownership and converted all land held under these categories into leasehold but made no attempt to resolve problems of overlapping land rights (Baland et al. 2007 ). Lack of implementation limited its impact (Hunt 2004) . Years of heated debate failed to produce an agreement on a legal basis for land that could have been included in the 1995 constitution, the constitution overturned the land reform decree and mandated passage of a land law within two years from the constitution coming into force.
The 1998 Land Act, adopted in response to this requirement, includes far-reaching steps to increase tenure security for three groups who had enjoyed little or no protection in the past, namely customary land users, occupants on mailo land, and women. First, and most important, customary ownership is formally recognized and occupants on customary land are converted into owners. Mechanisms are spelled out to allow customary owners to obtain a ''certificate of customary ownership'' that can be transferred through sale, rent, gift, or mortgage, and converted into freehold titles through a well-defined process. Second, mailo owners' demands to reinstate mailo land as a separate category made it politically impossible to award full ownership to tenants on such lands.
2 Still, tenants' rights are strengthened and granted far-reaching protection. Tenants who had peacefully occupied a piece of land for 12 years were given formal recognition upon payment of a nominal ground rent of USh 1,000 (about US$ 0.6) annually. With the consent of the registered owner, mailo tenants can apply for ''certificates of occupancy'' that include rights to give, sublet, mortgage, or inherit land, and can be converted into freehold titles. Third, although last-minute changes precluded inclusion of far-reaching provisions that would have strengthened a woman's position by giving automatic co-ownership to spousal land, 3 the Act nullified customary provisions that discriminate against women. A subsequent amendment introduced the concept of ''family land,'' defined as land used by the household to derive its livelihood, which cannot be transferred without the consent of the spouse or children depending on this land. The land act's progressive provisions, many of which are effective without any formal process or survey, are in stark contrast to institutional designs for implementation, which in most cases, seem to have been adopted with little effort to weigh costs and benefits to arrive at a compromise that could actually be implemented. Before proceeding towards implementation, it was thus necessary to completely redesign the implementation strategy for the Act (Hunt 2004) .
Three aspects are of particular interest. First, even though the Act mandates establishment of land committees at the lowest administrative level, financing to establish them was unavailable and would have been difficult to justify. 4 Even though their authority had de jure lapsed with the passage of the Act, local courts continued to dispense justice and were reinstated with adoption of the Land Act Implementation 2 A land fund was to be established to help customary tenants obtain certificates of occupancy and to give payment of compensation to land owners whose rights are diminished through such certificates. While the land fund and the associated promise of compensation to mailo landlords was partly needed to secure the consent of Baganda landlords to the Land Act, it also aimed to honor the President's pledge to secure land rights of tenants in Kibaale county, who had a major role in the independence struggle, by extinguishing the rights of landlords there (Hunt 2004) .
3 While the original draft had contained a clause that, through automatic co-ownership of land by both spouses in the household, aimed to strengthen property rights enjoyed by women significantly, this clause was dropped from the final version, leading to concerns that women may be particularly vulnerable, especially in the context of the significantly increased adult mortality caused by HIV/AIDS. 4 For each of the (then) 45 districts, a District Land board was to be set up to hold and allocate land not owned by a person or authority; facilitate the registration and transfer of interests in land; take over and exercise the powers of a lessor in respect of leases granted out of former public land; and compile and keep under review compensation rates payable where land is to be compulsorily acquired. Expenses and fees of the boards were to be charged to District Administration funds. In addition, Parish Land Committees for each of the approximately 4,517 parishes and Urban Land Committees for the 64 gazetted urban areas were to be established. The committees would be responsible for adjudicating boundaries and rights and issuance, as well as for maintenance of certificates of customary ownership. With the exception of the High Court, the act eliminated the jurisdiction of the courts over land disputes. Instead, it set up District Land Tribunals consisting of three members to be appointed by the chief justice on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. For each sub-county, urban area, and division of the city, a Sub-county Land Tribunal and an Urban Land Tribunal were to be established. However, no arrangements for funding the costs of these tribunals were made (McAuslan 2003) .
Strategy (Government of Uganda 1999), which included other far-reaching changes in the institutional design as well. Second, lack of ex ante analysis and survey techniques that would be sufficiently-low cost to allow a system of land administration to be sustained from user fees curtailed the extension of land administration to traditional areas and the issuance of certificates of customary ownership as envisaged in the legislation. In fact, seven years after passage of the Act, not a single one of these certificates has been awarded, despite considerable grassroots demand and the fact that in some areas work on systematic surveys with lower-cost technologies had been initiated (Rugadya, Obaiko, and Kamusiime 2004) . Lack of a sustainable business model and institutional structure imply that, even in traditional mailo areas, land administration does not live up to requirements. Third, there was a failure to widely disseminate the Act although it is recognized that few changes can be expected as long as there is no awareness of its basic provisions. More systematic efforts to do so, which include training sessions and distribution of leaflets in local languages, were initiated only very recently in preparation for pilots to systematically demarcate land in a few parishes. Although the fact that these activities remained limited to the parishes singled out for subsequent intervention provides us with an exogenous source of variation in the level of knowledge which can be utilized in econometric estimation, it implies that much remains to be done to ensure a minimum level of awareness of legal provisions among the population at large.
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This section introduces the variables to represent the different elements of interest and provides the justification for distinguishing tenure security from transferability. Relating our variables to the existing literature and the results obtained therein, we draw out implications and discuss the specification and framework for testing these relationships econometrically in the Ugandan context.
Determinants of Land-Related Investment: Conceptual and Measurement Issues
The empirical link between greater tenure security and transferability of land and incentives for investment and efficiency of resource use rests on three arguments. First, security of rights, that is, a reduction in the probability of being evicted or otherwise losing land rights has been shown to provide land users with greater assurance that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their labor, thus encouraging them to make long-term investments and manage land in a sustainable fashion (Besley 1995) . Having land rights defined clearly and accessible enforcement institutions available reduces the probability of unproductive spending on conflict, something that has been shown to have far-reaching impacts on productivity as well as equity (Deininger and Castagnini 2006) . Second, adding the right to transfer land to others, either through rental or sale, encourages investment, as it makes it easier to liquidate such investment in case of an exogenous shock (Deininger and Jin 2006) . It also constitutes an essential precondition for transactions that can help bring land to more efficient uses, thus maximizing output and allocative efficiency and creating the preconditions for labor to move from agriculture to non-agricultural pursuits in the broader context of economic development (Kung 2002) . With rapid economic transition (e.g., at the urban fringe or in areas of rapid commercial expansion) and the associated increase in the number of transactions, ways of ensuring the legitimacy of land transfers and eliminate incentives for opportunistic behavior by one of the contracting parties have been shown to be critical as well (Lavigne Delville 2002) . Finally, having a formalized and low-cost way to unambiguously identify land owners without the need to physically inspect the parcel, enquire with neighbors, or conduct an extensive search of land records, allows the use of land as collateral. This will, in turn, be critical to facilitate financial market development and the emergence of more sophisticated financial instruments that draw on the abstract representation of land rights provided by titles (de Soto 2000) .
Differentiating elements of property rights in this way illustrates two points. First, although they do not form a necessary evolutionary sequence, different elements build upon each other and the institutions to support them become increasingly more sophisticated and costly to implement (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997) . Second, any land tenure regime defines a multi-dimensional bundle of rights, the content of which often differs depending on local circumstances. More disaggregated information on the individual ''sticks'' in this bundle will be required to accurately assess the impact of specific rights. In fact, the high variability in the results from empirical studies aiming to explore the impact of title (Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994; Migot-Adholla, Place, and OluochKosura 1994; Roth, Cochrane, and Kisamba-Mugerwa 1994) can be interpreted as resulting at least partly from omission of ''lesser'' rights to transfer land, with or without permission by the lineage or a finer gradation of tenure security linked to this arrangement in specific contexts. For example, formal title can have maximum impact on increasing tenure security if owners and potential buyers are aware of the significance of such documents, they are socially accepted, unambiguous, up to date, and backed up by enforcement institutions that are accessible at low cost. Even then, the cost of establishing a system of title may be justified only if there is demand for credit. In particular if resources are limited, lower cost options that can be upgraded incrementally may be an option to provide ''adequate'' level of security to a greater number of people.
For our analysis, two implications stand out. First, to do justice to the multidimensional and complex structure of property rights, it will be desirable to have empirical representations of the different elements in the bundle separately. An obvious implication is the need to distinguish security against eviction or land loss from transferability, that is, the ability to transfer land to other users in the market for either sales or rental. Even though transfer rights and tenure security can be synonymous, as is implicitly assumed in a large number of studies (Blarel 1994; Matlon 1994; Place and Migot-Adholla 1998; Place and Otsuka 2001) , this is by no means necessary. In fact, there are many situations where the correlation between security and transferability is modest at best. 5 In this case, treating the two as interchangeable can lead to flawed conclusions, for example, recommending improvements in transferability rather than greater attention to tenure security. For example, in Ethiopia security against land loss has effects that are distinct from those of transferability (Ayalew, Dercon, and Gautam 2005; Deininger and Jin 2006), a nuance the far-reaching policy implications of which will be lost if both are lumped together.
Second, empirical research on land tenure in Africa has rarely paid attention to the fact that owners' knowledge of their rights is not only a sine qua non for their ability to enforce these rights, but will also affect their behavior. The ''power of knowledge'' has been highlighted in a wide array of contexts such as the allocation of public funds (Reinikka and Svensson 2003) , the quality and effectiveness of public service delivery (Deininger and Mpuga 2005) , and policies for natural resource management (Pender et al. 2004) . Whether knowledge will encourage or discourage investment and prudent management of scarce resources will obvi- 5 Land rights that are fully transferable, but highly insecure are often encountered in post-conflict situations as in Nicaragua or Cambodia (Sophal, Saravy, and Acharya 2001; Deininger and Chamorro 2004) . On the other hand, a number of countries such as Ethiopia, Mexico, India, or China impose restrictions on the transferability of land through either rental or sale even though tenure security is often quite high especially following recent legal changes and efforts to register land rights (Zepeda 2000; Haque 2001; Teklu and Lemi 2004; Deininger and Jin 2005). ously depend on how legal provisions relate to current practice. If, as in our case, legal provisions give greater recognition to the rights of those occupying land, we would expect legal knowledge to have an unambiguously positive impact. Where, on the other hand, such provisions declare existing practices, which may enjoy broad social legitimacy, as illegal, awareness of the law may have a negative or more ambiguous impact.
6 As many African countries have recently introduced new land legislation but made limited progress in disseminating or implementing them (Alden-Wily 2003), a direct measure of households' knowledge is needed to distinguish situations where the law is not appropriate from those where a judgment on this issue is impossible due to lack of implementation and awareness.
Empirical Strategy
Uganda provides an interesting context to explore some of the above issues empirically for a number of reasons. As discussed above, the 1998 land law has a potentially far-reaching impact on the rights of most rural cultivators that many not have been fully realized due to lack of dissemination. Distinguishing between tenure status, conditional or unconditional transferability, and specific legal knowledge allows us to disentangle some of the different elements of the property rights bundle. Linking these to outcome indicators, in particular whether or not visible (tree) or non-visible (mulching, application of manure) investment was undertaken, the productivity of land use, and self-assessed land values, allows us to assess the investment impact and productivity impact of different tenure arrangements, test for differential effects of the former, and make inferences on potential impacts of better disseminating legal arrangements among those concerned.
Our empirical approach differs by outcome variable, that is, investment, productivity of land use, and land values. Greater security against eviction and transferability have long been held to increase the propensity to make visible and non-visible investments (Deininger and Jin 2006) . Transferability will also enhance the ability to use land as collateral for credit, although this is of limited relevance as long as the investments considered are labor-intensive. Higher levels of tenure security and transferability will increase productivity of land use through their effect on investment. Tenure security will also affect producers' incentives to exert effort and may be correlated with unobservable stocks of non-visible investments accumulated from the past. Transferability, in turn, may enhance productivity by making it easier for producers to obtain input credit. As land prices represent the present value of the income stream to be derived from a piece of land, they provide a way of checking the consistency of our results and to summarize the impact of policy change in a statistic that is easily understood and can be used to compare cost and benefit of alternative policy action.
Specific tenure variables used include the formal tenure regime, presence of ownership as compared to mere occupancy rights, length of occupation, and the household's knowledge of current legal provisions. To represent the level of transferability, we follow the literature and add the number of transfer rights in three dimensions (sale, rental, and bequest) at the parcel level (Besley 1995) . We do so for the ability to exercise rights with and without outside approval, thus obtaining indices of conditional and unconditional rights. Our knowledge variable is based on household members' response to six questions on key aspects of the new law based on a multiple choice quiz that was administered to male and female households separately. In line with the main innovations by the Act, questions focus on three elements, namely
(1) awareness of the land rights awarded by this law and the channels to enforce these rights; (2) knowledge of the scope for government to impose restrictions on land use, especially by mailo tenants; and (3) recognition and protection of women's land rights. Linking different types of rights and knowledge to observed outcomes then provides us with a set of hypotheses, to be discussed in more detail below.
Land-related investment. We use a dummy for whether any trees were planted during the five-year period preceding the survey and the number of trees planted as indicators for visible long-term investment. Invisible investment is proxied by whether or not the plot had received manure, mulch, or crop residue during the year preceding the survey. Letting I denote either the amount of land-related long-term investment or a dummy for whether or not visible or invisible investment was undertaken and indexing households by h and parcels by i, the estimating equation can be written as
where I hi denotes the different indicators of investment as defined above and X h and P hi are vectors of household and parcel characteristics, respectively, to control for heterogeneity across farmers and parcels (e.g., in terms of soil quality, topography and location). At the parcel level, R hi is a vector of perceived transfer rights, T hi is a dummy variable representing the tenure type (freehold/mailo or customary) of a given parcel and O hi , which is interacted with T hi , is a dummy for whether the plot is owned or occupied. K h is an index measuring household h's knowledge of the land law, V is a vector of infrastructure at village level such as distance to the nearest district city and electricity access, e hi is an i.i.d. error term, and the remaining Greek letters are coefficients to be estimated.
To construct R hi , we add the number of transfer rights for each parcel as described above. As the formal documentation for freehold and mailo land is identical, we let T h equal one if the parcel is held under either of these forms (including also two parcels held under leasehold tenure) and zero otherwise. To capture the difference between owners and mere occupants on mailo or freehold land, we interact T h with an occupancy dummy which will also allow us to make inferences on possible benefits from regularizing mailo occupants. The level of legal knowledge, K h , at the household level is represented by the maximum score in the quiz administered to both the main male and female household members, implicitly assuming that such information is fully shared within the household.
While many empirical studies assume rights to be exogenously given, others show that farmers make land related investments to enhance such rights (Besley 1995; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau 2002; Place and Otsuka 2002) . In our context, although a parcel's tenure status can be considered exogenous, investments to increase transferability of land are a concern that is of empirical relevance. If transferability is endogenous, estimation of the above model by OLS will yield biased estimates. We thus use the Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimator which has been shown to provide consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates for limited dependent variable models (Newey 1987) . As is standard in IV techniques, this procedure requires inclusion of identifying variables that are exogenous causes of variation in the rights variables but do not directly affect land-related investments. In the absence of information on lagged rights, a variable used as an instrument in a number of applications is the mode of acquisition (Besley 1995) . To represent it in the first stage regression, we distinguish whether a plot has been inherited, separately from the husband's and the wife's family, rented-in, or occupied without permission, with purchase being the excluded category.
To the extent that unobserved characteristics such as mental agility and interest in community affairs are likely to affect the level of knowledge and propensity to undertake land-related investments, the AGLS estimates will still suffer from omitted variable bias. We use three sets of retrospective variables from our survey as identifying instruments for knowledge. First, radio ownership and parents' educational attainment affect general levels of exposure to information including knowledge about the land law. Second, while past land conflicts have been shown to no longer affect land-related investment (Deininger and Castagnini 2006) , having been party to a land conflict in the past is likely to have resulted in higher awareness of the legal situation. Also, as those purchasing or selling land will have an incentive to study the legal background, we expect past land sales market participation (either purchasing or selling) will have a similar effect on the level of knowledge but not investment. Finally, given the debate on mailo land and the 1998 Land Act's requirement for mailo tenants to pay ground rent to the landlord, we expect those who, at the point of household formation, had mailo land, to be more aware of legal developments.
Based on the above, we expect that the variables measuring transferability and specific knowledge of the provisions of the Land Act, both appropriately instrumented, will have a positive effect on landrelated investments, partly by increasing tenure security. Regressions can also be used to test differences between customary and freehold/mailo tenure that might affect investment. In fact, for the latter, we can explore differences between owners and occupants by assessing whether the sign of the coefficient on the freehold/mailo dummy or the sum of this coefficient and its interaction with the occupancy dummy is significantly different from zero. 7 The magnitude of the latter would allow quantification of the increment in investment incentives that could be expected from regularizing mailo tenants whereas the former could help to assess the importance of knowledge relative to more traditional indicators of land tenure.
Productivity of land use. While the general framework is similar, separate regressions for the productivity of land use, where past investments are included as right hand side variables allow us to test the extent to which the various indicators of the tenure regime, transferability, and knowledge have an impact over and above their effect on investment. As discussed above, finding such an effect would point towards increased incentives to supply effort (in case of tenure security) or greater ability to obtain credit (in case of transferability). We estimate a production function where the gross value of output is a function of input use, the presence of improvements and other parcel as well as household characteristics, and our proxies for tenure security. The specification takes the form,
where Y hi is the value of crop output of household h from parcel i, Z hi is the value of purchased inputs on each parcel, Q hi is a vector denoting the pre-existing stock of different types of land-related investments (number of trees, soil and water conservation infrastructure), and u hi is an error term. All the other variables are as defined in [1] . In addition to expecting positive coefficients on standard land quality and human capital characteristics, we also expect the stock of land-related improvements (visible and non-visible) will increase the productivity capacity of land, the variables that measure tenure security may have an additional positive impact on productivity by increasing labor effort or the ability to obtain credit. Land values. As land values encapsulate the present vlue of expected profits from 7 As marginal effects of interaction terms in non-linear models cannot be evaluated by simply examining sign and significance of the coefficients of the interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003) , the focus here is on the effect of freehold/mailo tenure (ownership or occupancy) relative to customary ownership rather than on the marginal effect freehold/mailo tenure on the propensity and magnitude of land-related investments as the ownership-occupancy status changes. To obtain a proper assessment of the latter, other techniques, e.g., analysis of plot-level data within the same household, would have to be applied.
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Deininger, Ali, and Yamano: Legal Knowledge and Economic Developmentcultivating a plot, any factor that affects land productivity should have a similar impact in a hedonic land price regression (Rosen 1974) . Regressing self-assessed land prices on the same set of right-hand side variables as was used in the productivity regression thus provides a way of checking for the robustness of our results, in addition to allowing the derivation of a monetary value for some of the variables included earlier.
Presence of considerable noise in the land price data by occupants forces us to restrict the sample to owned plots for which we estimate a land value function of the form
where L hi is the subjective land value of parcel i owned by household h, and n hi is an error term. The interaction term of the tenure regime with ownership status is excluded because the estimation is done on a sub-sample of owners for the reason mentioned above. Given the subjective nature of reported land values and the fact that household characteristics may affect the ability to make the most productive use of land, we also control for household characteristics and expect signs of the coefficients on the different variables to be consistent with what had been obtained earlier.
IV. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
The data for our analysis are from a survey conducted in the second half of 2004 by the World Bank in collaboration with the then Ministry of Water Land and Environment (MWLE), 8 Makerere University, and FASID to provide a baseline that could help to study the impact of systematic demarcation at a later stage. In each of six districts, chosen to capture the diversity of Uganda's different regions, one parish that had been purposively selected for systematic demarcation based on interest by local government and a neighboring parish with similar characteristics were chosen, 9 yielding a sample of 970 households or 2,185 parcels in 12 parishes. Within parishes, households were randomly selected from voting lists. In addition to standard variables included in multi-purpose household surveys, the data contain results from administering a quiz on key innovations by the new land Act to both the main male and female decisionmaker (usually head and spouse) to assess levels of legal knowledge. This is complemented by information on land ownership and transfer rights, soil quality, and production at the plot level.
Key statistics for parcels owned or operated by the sample households, by main tenure type, as reported in Table 1 , yield a number of insights. First, contrary to widespread belief, the difference in transferability between freehold and customary tenure is one of degree (i.e., unconditional vs. conditional), rather than principle. In fact, while the ability to sell without restrictions is, with 50%, lowest under the customary tenure regime, 26% of customary holders, as compared to 12% under freehold and 8% under mailo, are able to sell provided they have obtained prior approval. Even though the number of rights that can be exercised without approval is highest for freehold parcels, customary parcels have the highest number of rights with approval, while mailo comes in lowest in both categories. Customary lands do thus not appear to suffer from limited transferability; to the contrary, constraints to land transfers may be more of an issue on mailo land, an interpretation that is supported by similar differences in the ability to rent and to give land with or without approval across tenure categories. Land sales values are only for owners, but not for renters. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for the t-statistic to test the equality of group means using customary tenure as a reference group.
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Figures on the mode of acquisition suggest that about half of the parcels were inherited, in the majority (43% overall) from the husband's family, while 28% were purchased, and 19% rented in. Concerning land-related investments, one of the key variables in our analysis, we note a clear difference between the presence of trees and recent investments in such improvements. While 46% of parcels have tree crops (66% on freehold, 53% on mailo, and 42% on customary land), only about one quarter of households made tree investments during the last five years (41% on freehold, 30% on mailo, and 25% on customary lands), planting on average 30 trees (33 on customary land and about 25 each on freehold and mailo). About 25% practiced soil conservation (32% on freehold, 28% on mailo, and 23% on customary). The fact that more than 97% of parcels have no formal document implies that use of a title dummy would not be a good approximation of households' level of tenure security, quite apart from the fact that even where households claim to have such a document, its currency or legal value may be open to doubt.
Limited availability of legal documents, in particular non-existence of customary certificates, made it impractical to ask households about their attitude to titles vs. certificates of customary ownership. It is, however, worth noting that more than 95% of those who could obtain some document (i.e., 65% of the parcels without a document) actually want to have one. Moreover, with 89%, a surprisingly high share indicated that they would be willing to pay a mean and median amount of US$17 and US$6 per acre, respectively. This clearly implies that households perceive formal documents to add value. To make this relevant for policy, better knowledge on two factors would be desirable. First, identifying the underlying factors would be important, in particular exploring the extent to which legal ignorance drives demand for formal certificates, whether the expectations surrounding such certificates are realistic, and whether cheap customary certificates, rather than costly titles can respond to such demand. Second, assuming that there is ''real'' demand, ways of satisfying it most effectively will need to be explored by complementing the amounts households are willing to pay for first-time registration with fee schedules for registering subsequent transactions and by linking these to the cost of service provision so as to ensure that recurrent operation of the registry can be covered from user fees that are affordable and below the value added which most users perceive to derive from use of this facility.
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Mean self-assessed values for land sales or rental amount to US$718 and US$34 per acre, respectively. Closer inspection of these prices suggests that policy announcements regarding the planned establishment of a land fund, to be used by government to purchase land in Kibaale (the only mailo region included in the sample), had a significant impact on prices. Compared to sale prices of US$550 and US$600 per acre for customary and freehold land, respectively, mailo owners in this district believe their land to be worth more than 10 times this amount (US$7,000 per acre). Even though the mean is affected by outliers, the median self-assessed land value for mailo owners of US$1,300 per acre is still more than four times that of customary and freehold owners (US$202 and US$289 per acre, respectively). As mailo land that is ''encumbered'' by presence of a tenant with permanent and inheritable occupancy rights, prices for such land should actually be significantly lower than that of freehold land.
Together with the fact that a difference of this magnitude cannot be justified by underlying productivity characteristics, this suggests that the announcement of the land 10 The ability to have a financially independent registry or the share of first-time registration costs that can be covered from user fees will depend on the costeffectiveness with which services can be provided. While it cannot substitute detailed exploration of the relevant parameters in the Ugandan context, experience from Ethiopia suggests that technologies for providing such services at a cost that is in line with the stated willingness to pay is possible (Deininger et al. 2008). fund has led to a speculative increase in land prices. This will not only make it much harder to finance the land purchases envisaged under this fund but also casts further doubt on the justification, at least from a poverty perspective, of such a scheme as the costs are likely to be enormous while most of the benefits will accrue to wealthy land owners who would be paid inflated prices by the government for the land they ''offer.'' The fact that mailo parcels are estimated to fetch US$156 per acre in rental markets, compared to US$29 for customary and US$65 for freehold lands, a difference that is maintained if one looks at the median instead where rental prices are US$43, US$30, and US$15, respectively. This suggests that inflated expectations have also affected hypothetical land rental prices, thus negatively affecting potential renters' ability to gain access to such lands through market mechanisms. Finding ways to increase security of mailo tenants in a way that is more incentive compatible (and less costly) than the open-ended promise of financing under the land fund will be critical.
Comparing hypothetical land values to the total value of production net of cash input costs suggests that with the exception of mailo areas, land sales prices are, at about seven times profits, in line with international evidence. Figures on input use also suggest that, with only 1% of producers using fertilizer and 4% applying pesticides, use of chemical inputs is very low; in contrast to about 50% who purchase seeds and 32% who rely at least partly on hired labor. This is consistent with other studies of Ugandan agriculture (Pender 2004 ). There are significant differences across tenure regimes in the extent to which higher value root crops, fruits, or cooking banana (matooke) is cultivated. While these are likely to be rooted in inherent variation of agro-ecological suitability, soil fertility, and market access, the high correlation of such regional features with tenure status implies that, to avoid misinterpretation of the tenure variable, we will need to adjust for such inherent productivity differences. Table 2 presents key household characteristics for all households and by quartile of the asset distribution. The importance of land and of policies affecting it is illustrated by the fact that land constitutes more than 60% of the total assets owned by sampled households. With a Gini coefficient of 0.80 for the total value of non-land assets where the bottom quartile owns less than US$50 and the top quartile more than 100 times this amount, inequality in non-land assets is high. We find similar gaps in terms of land values (the sum of the value of owned and occupied parcels) though not as the same level of magnitude as the value of non-land assets. The value of land held by the top quartile (US$5,939) is ten times higher than that held by the bottom quartile. There is also a high correlation between ownership of human and physical capital assets as well as income levels. Although our data do not allow comparison over time, they are not inconsistent with evidence suggesting a widening of the gap in assets as well as educational achievement between rural and urban areas, increasing inequality, and a rise of rural poverty following a good record of poverty reduction in the country (Kappel, Lay, and The table illustrates that a key difference between rich and poor households is that the former have access to more diversified income sources, especially wage income (33% for the top as compared to less than 15% for all the three bottom quartiles) and sale of livestock products (62% as compared to less than 30% for the bottom). The importance of improved agricultural productivity, and the possible contribution of secure land rights, for poverty reduction is illustrated by the high dependence of the poor on income from crop production; those in the three bottom quintiles receive about two-thirds of their total income from crops, as compared to a much lower share (24%) for the top quartile. We also note that, with only about one-quarter as compared to almost one-half of households in the top quartile, the level of knowledge about the new land law increases signifi-cantly with asset ownership and with educational level. Table 3 contains more specific evidence on male and female household members' knowledge of key aspects of the new land law. As less than 30% of overall respondents provided correct answers, we conclude that the level of legal knowledge remains limited and that the issues probed have discriminatory power. First, two questions relate to customary lands, aiming to explore whether households are aware that the new law legitimizes customary tenure and allows receipt of certificates of customary land ownership that can be converted into fully surveyed ownership certificates upon payment of a fee. Although slightly higher among customary owners (39% as compared to 36% for the total), the level of awareness about this regulation remains fairly low even among male respondents and is slightly lower for female ones. Second, questions regarding mailo tenants aim to enquire whether respondents know that such tenants are, under certain circumstances, protected from eviction and whether, landlords can prohibit tenants from planting perennials on the land they occupy for fear of gaining permanent rights-an issue which will have immediate impacts on a Occupied parcels are evaluated using the median prices corresponding to the respective communities. Rented-in (both under fixed and sharecropping contracts) and borrowed-in parcels are excluded while computing the value of land occupied by the household.
tenants' investment incentives. Responses indicate that more than 50% of mailo tenants in the sample are not aware of the tenure security afforded to them under the new law and almost 70% mistakenly believe that the landlord can prevent them from planting trees or undertaking other landimproving investments. The latter is likely to reduce their willingness to take advantage of opportunities to make the most productive use of their land. A final set of legal questions refers to the conditions under which occupancy rights can be acquired and to gender aspects, that is, whether protection afforded by law to women's rights on family land, which was introduced to compensate for the loss of the co-ownership clause, is unconditional or requires administrative intervention. Regarding the latter we find that, even though there is no need for any government intervention, less than one-third of the individuals asked know about this. The fact that more than two-thirds of women are unaware of their legal rights to land could have far-reaching implications for investment and land-use decisions that can in turn translate into lower levels of productivity and also suggests that the concept of ''family land'' may be a poor substitute for co-ownership of land. Dissemination to overcome the ignorance surrounding key provisions of the Land Act could have significant impacts, the potential magnitude of which is explored in more detail below using more rigorous econometric evidence.
V. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Exploring the impact of tenure security and transferability on investment, productivity, and land values provides support for our hypotheses that disaggregation of different types of land rights (i.e., tenure security and transferability) can provide important insights. It also suggests that the legal change can provide very large benefits. To the extent that lack of dissemination by the government and the corresponding knowledge gaps by households have thus far prevented full realization of the benefits from this Act, efforts to better disseminate the new law will have a high return. Source: Own computation from 2004 WB/Makerere/FASID land tenure survey. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for the t-statistic to test the equality of group means using customary tenure as a reference group.
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Deininger, Ali, and Yamano: Legal Knowledge and Economic DevelopmentFactors Affecting Land-Related Investment Table 4 presents results from the secondstage AGLS regression to identify determinants of land-related investment, measured by a dummy for whether or not trees were planted (column 1), soil conservation measures were undertaken (column 3), or the number of trees planted per acre in logs (column 5). Coefficients on parcel characteristics such as distance to the house, land quality, plot size, and topography are significant, indicating that long-term investment is more likely on parcels that are close to the homestead, larger in size, steep or undulating rather than completely flat, and have at least medium levels of land quality.
As expected, greater transfer rights are associated with significantly higher levels of long-term investment (tree-planting), but they have only marginally significant impact on the propensity to undertake soil conservation measures. This could be partly explained by the fact that transferability in the sales market matters less for invisible short-term investments than for visible improvements that are likely to affect land prices. At the margin, adding one unconditional or conditional right to the existing bundle is estimated to increase the probability of tree planting by between 6% and 11%. Interestingly, the point estimate for the coefficient on conditional rights (i.e., with outside approval) is larger than that on the coefficient on unconditional rights although we cannot statistically reject equality of the two. This implies that concerns about the need for spousal approval acting as a significant break on landrelated investment that have featured prominently in the debate surrounding passage of the Land Act (Ovonji-Odida 2002) appear to be ill-founded, at least for the lands and investments considered here.
Consistent with the coefficients on transferability, the propensity to make long-term investments is higher on land held under freehold or mailo tenure with the point estimate suggesting a marginal effect of 15%. However, this impact is confined to owners; the negative coefficient on the dummy for tenants or occupants, and the inability to reject the hypothesis of the sum of both equaling zero imply that, although being located on mailo or freehold land, tenants' propensity to make long-term investments is not different from that of customary owners. The point estimates for addition of one (conditional or unconditional) transfer right are about one-half of the estimated investment-enhancing impact of freehold tenure, although we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis of c 1 , c 2 , and Q 1 being equal. This supports the notion that tenure status is of importance while at the same time illustrating the scope for less complex and costly changes in land rights to have a significant investment-effect.
The coefficients on (instrumented) knowledge of the land law at the household level are significant and positive suggesting that, irrespectively of the land tenure regime, better knowledge of legal provisions, along the dimensions discussed earlier, will have a significant and quantitatively large impact on the propensity to make long-term investments. The marginal impact of exogenously increasing a household's knowledge on one additional item is estimated to increase this figure by slightly more than 10%. Also, results from the twostep Tobit regression reject the hypothesis that knowledge of the land law will not significantly affect the number of trees planted. Since the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected, a simple Tobit regression may provide more efficient estimates and then the marginal effects can be computed easily than the AGLS model. Results from doing so, reported in Appendix Table A3 , suggest that an exogenous increase in legal knowledge from the current level to full awareness of the law would be associated with a 75% increase in the number of trees planted per acre.
11
The importance of legal knowledge is reinforced by the significance and magnitude of the coefficient of the predicted The linear predicted value of the household level knowledge index of the land law from the regression results given in Appendix Table 1 is used to address the potential problem of endogeneity. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Deininger, Ali, and Yamano: Legal Knowledge and Economic Developmentvalues of knowledge index for short-term soil conservation. An increase of a household's legal knowledge by one element would, according to the coefficients, result in an increase in the propensity to undertake soil conservation that is equivalent to increasing the length of possession by more than 15 years or the head's level of education by more than seven years. In addition to being significant, the length of time for which the plot has been held by the household has the expected positive sign. The rather modest size of the coefficient suggests that long possession has little potential to improve what are essentially defective rights. Results are similar for short-term investments with the exception of a smaller negative coefficient on distance to the house, and lack of significance of the land quality and topography variables. Consistent with the limited visibility of the fruits of short-term investment, we find weak evidence of transferability on increasing such activity, further reinforcing the importance of legal knowledge on the way in which land is used. In fact, the x 2 -test statistic rejects equality of the coefficients on both variables suggesting that knowledge of the law matters more than having transfer rights to the land in making shortand long-term land-related investments. Household characteristics that increase farmer's propensity to invest include the level of education on soil conservation practices, and, somewhat surprisingly, a dummy indicating that the household is headed by a female. Higher levels of household assets in the past have no appreciable impact on investments in soil fertility, but reduce the propensity to plant trees, pointing towards a substitution effect between land-attached and other productive assets.
The underlying first-stage regressions for knowledge of the 1998 Land Act at the household level and transfer rights at the parcel level are presented in Appendix  Tables A1 and A2 , respectively. For knowledge, we note that all identifying instruments are jointly different from zero and thus use fitted values in the investment, productivity, and land value regressions reported below.
12 Results for transfer rights at the plot-level point towards a significant impact of the mode of acquisition on the transfer rights for any given parcel (omitted categories are mailo tenure and purchased land, respectively). Plots that had been inherited or just occupied, as well as house plots (or those closer to home) are significantly more likely to be transferable only with outside approval, than are plots under mailo or freehold tenure and those closer to urban centers and infrastructure (electricity) are more likely not to be subject to such restrictions, while rented plots are significantly less likely to be transferable at all. Households' level of education and their knowledge about the land Act make it more likely for them to be aware of the conditions imposed on transferability of land.
Productivity Determinants
Results from the OLS and GMM regressions with the log of the value of annual crop production per parcel as dependent variable are presented in Table 5 . Column 1 contains the reduced form while column 2 adds proxy variables for tenure security (tenure type and predicted values of knowledge index) and transferability (conditional and unconditional rights) while column 3 contains additional controls for agro-ecological suitability. Column 4 reports the results of the GMM specification in which transfer rights are instrumented by mode of acquisition variables similar to the land-12 Note that the types of knowledge included in our quiz are highly specific, while the investments considered in our regressions are all very labor intensive, low-tech, and of modest value compared to the rather high cost of obtaining information on a law that most of the respondents in our survey are not even aware of. Thus reverse causality, whereby those about to undertake investment would first consult the law, is unlikely to be an issue. Although the predictive power of the knowledge regression is, with a R 2 of 0.17, modest, this is not unexpected in a cross-section (Greene 2003) . What is more relevant in our context is the high joint significance of the identifying instruments, the F-statistic for which comfortably passes the minimum criteria suggested in the literature on this topic (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997). related investment regressions. We also adjust for non-use of certain inputs with dummies (Battese 1997) , the coefficients for which are not reported due to space constraints. Results indicate that household size, used as a proxy for family labor, and hired labor are positively and significantly associated with the value of crop production. The same is true for other conventional inputs with the exception of chemical fertilizer and pesticides, the use and intensity of which are very low. Coefficients on other parcel and household characteristics generally have the expected sign. The most a Transfer rights variables are instrumented using mode of acquisition as identifying instruments. The Hansen J overidentification test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are statistically valid, and the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test rejected the null hypothesis that that the model is underidentified. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Deininger, Ali, and Yamano: Legal Knowledge and Economic Developmentimportant is the increased availability of moisture on swamps and wetlands which is estimated to have a very significant and large (about 75%) positive impact on the value of crop production, most likely due to the ability to obtain multiple crops per year.
Poor soil quality has a marginally negative effect (significant at 5% or 10%, depending on the specification), but topography does not have any significance effect. While the coefficient on household assets looses significance once tenure characteristics are added, human capital endowments are significant throughout, suggesting that an additional year of education by the head will increase output by about 2%. Availability of markets and infrastructure, proxied by the distance to the next biggest town, is weakly significant at 10%. The regression also allows insights on the impact of tenure security and land-related investments. Land improvements in the form of both tree planting and soil conservation have a strongly positive effect on productivity of land use in all the specifications. Inability to reject the hypothesis that the marginal impact of additional tree planting on productivity equals that of additional investment in soil conservation measures, irrespectively of whether a dummy for presence of trees or the actual number of trees is used, testifies to the importance of the latter and the high relevance of tenure security indicators which, according to our earlier results, are the variables that have significant impact on soil fertility investment.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 illustrate that knowledge of the law does not have an independent impact on productivity of land use. The insignificant coefficient on transfer rights implies that such rights affect productivity only indirectly through long-term and to some extent short-term investments, suggesting that the levels of transferability enjoyed currently is not the most binding constraint for producers' ability to access credit or otherwise improve productivity. The positive and highly significant coefficient on freehold or mailo tenure in column 2 could point towards an independent credit effect that is associated with availability of land title. The fact that the significance of this coefficient completely disappears once indicators of agro-ecological suitability are added in column 3 and 4 suggests that other forces may be at play and further investigation may be warranted. Similarly, the number of years a plot has been in possession of the household is estimated to have no significant impact on productivity. This indicates that tenure regime, legal knowledge, and greater transferability have no direct impact on productivity over and above their indirect effects through increased propensity to undertake land-related investments.
Land Value Determinants
Results from equation [3] , reported in Table 6 for several specifications, with and without knowledge and (instrumented) rights variables, are largely consistent with earlier evidence. In all the specifications, we include a dummy for mailo to control for price inflation on such land that had been noted earlier. In fact, the highly significant and large coefficient on this variable (of almost 1.4) supports the notion of considerable overvaluation of mailo land as a result of having the land fund. Land prices are estimated to decrease in parcel size, albeit at a decreasing rate and location in a swamp or wetland increases values by 50% to 70%. The negative coefficients on flat and steeply sloped land suggest that hilly or undulating land, the base category, is considered more valuable than these categories. Land in places where public electricity is accessible and located closer to markets and infrastructures are also significantly more valuable. With the exception of the head's level of education as well as total asset holdings, no other household level variables emerge as significant.
While presence of long-term investment, that is, the number of trees on any given parcel, is estimated to have a very positive impact with an elasticity of 10% to 14% depending on the specification, we cannot confirm a significant impact of soil conser-vation on land prices. This may be because such investments are less easily noticed by an outsider who might wish to purchase the land. Including variables for subjective and objective tenure security and transferability (column 2) adds two elements of interest. First, legal knowledge, our proxy for households' subjective level of tenure security and their ability to enforce the law, is highly significant and positive; the point estimate suggests that a shift from complete ignorance to perfect knowledge of our land law indicators would increase land values by about 160%, implying that acquisition of knowledge on any individual right will be associated with an increase in land values by about 20%. While we fail to find a direct impact of transfer rights on land values, the large and significant mailo dummy suggests that, after adjusting for quality differences, the land fund announcement may have more than doubled land prices which, paradoxically, will make it harder to implement such a measure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although a large number of African countries have recently embarked on revisions of land legislation that aim to give legal recognition to existing customary arrangements and strengthen women's rights, few studies assess the actual or potential economic impact of such steps. As a result, the policy and analytical debate still largely revolves around the traditional titling paradigm and support for implementing new approaches has remained modest. By using a more disaggregated set of rights and including a measure of legal knowledge as potential determinants of investment, productivity of land use, and Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Deininger, Ali, and Yamano: Legal Knowledge and Economic Developmentland values in Uganda, this paper adds to the methodological debate and policy discussion in a number of ways. Methodologically, our findings suggest that one reason for the divergent conclusions on the impact of title in the literature may be a failure to account for the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of land rights in Africa which are often not adequately captured by traditional tenure categories. A disaggregated view of individual ''sticks'' in the property rights bundle illustrate that in some cases traditional stereotypes (e.g., regarding limited transferability of customary land) may have to be revisited. We also find a clear difference between rights to transfer land, which increase the propensity to undertake visible investments that can be expected to affect land values in case of a sale, and other measures of tenure security (e.g., length of occupancy), which also increase the tendency to manage soil fertility in a sustainable manner.
Households' awareness of their land rights as defined by the new Land Act in a number of dimensions has a significant and large impact on outcome variables the quantitative importance of which may even be larger than that of some of the traditional land rights variables. This significant and quantitatively large impact of legal knowledge is of relevance in a number of respects. It suggests that, by revising legislation to increase the level of tenure security and legal protection enjoyed by customary owners and women, African countries have focused on a critical aspect. In the case of Uganda, the strong positive relationship between households' knowledge of the law and land-related investments and, through such investments on productivity and land values, found here is consistent with the hypothesis that such legal provisions have focused on key constraints. At the same time, the fact that only a minority of land users is aware of these provisions implies that the lion's share of the associated productivity gains remains to be realized. Given their low cost, especially if compared to efforts to demarcate lands, programs to disseminate the law and make households aware of their rights could thus have very high returns.
While we find that, where as in Uganda, legal provisions strengthen the rights of existing occupants and land users, dissemination of existing legal provisions can have significant benefits, our data also points towards significant demand for land certificates that is backed up by realistic willingness to pay. While this implies that dissemination is a necessary first step, it will not obviate the need to establish cost-effective land administration systems. Identifying cost-effective mechanisms to establish and maintain records in a way that allows broad access and does not close options for upgrading (with cost recovery) if and when the need arises will be an important medium to long-term issue.
In addition to responding to existing demand, programs to systematically educate individuals about their rights and subsequently issue certificates, if sequenced appropriately, would provide an opportunity to not only sharpen our estimates of the benefits from legal knowledge but also to compare them to the impact of more traditional interventions to demarcate and register plots, the channels through which such impacts come about, and the degree to which they are affected by initial conditions. Extending our analysis in this direction would be a high priority for future research. Given the multiple challenges faced by land tenure systems and the importance of increasing agricultural productivity to sustainably reduce poverty in many parts of Africa, such an extension would be of relevance far beyond Uganda. 
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